Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives by Schmitz, Patrick W.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Incomplete Contracts, Shared
Ownership, and Investment Incentives
Patrick W. Schmitz
2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/90801/
MPRA Paper No. 90801, posted 28 December 2018 02:38 UTC
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and
Investment Incentives
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne, Germany, and CEPR, London, UK
Abstract
Consider a partnership consisting of two symmetrically informed parties who may
each own a share of an asset. It is ex post e¢ cient that tomorrow the party with
the larger valuation gets the asset. Yet, today the parties can make investments
to enhance the assets productivity. Contracts are incomplete, so today only the
ownership structure can be specied, which may be renegotiated tomorrow. It
turns out that shared ownership is often optimal. If the investments are embodied
in the physical asset, it may be optimal that party B has a larger ownership share
even when party A has a larger valuation and a better investment technology.
When shared ownership is taken into account, joint ownership in the sense of
bilateral veto power cannot be optimal, regardless of whether the investments
are in human capital or in physical capital.
Keywords: property rights, incomplete contracts, investment incentives, partner-
ship dissolution, shared ownership
JEL Classication: D23; D86; C78; L24; O32
 Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln,
Germany. E-mail address: <patrick.schmitz@uni-koeln.de>. Tel.: +49 221 470 5609; fax: +49
221 470 5077. I would like to thank Eva Hoppe, Daniel Müller, and two anonymous reviewers
for helpful comments and suggestions. This paper was written at the University of Bonn; I am
very grateful to Eva Hoppe and Matthias Kräkel for their hospitality.
1
1 Introduction
Consider a partnership consisting of two risk-neutral parties each of whom owns
a share of an asset that can be traded tomorrow. Clearly, it is ex post e¢ cient
that the party with the larger valuation of the asset will get 100 percent of the
asset tomorrow. Yet, suppose that today the parties can make non-contractible
investments in order to enhance the productivity of the asset. We analyze who
should initially own the asset, given that tomorrow negotiations between the
symmetrically informed parties will result in the ex post e¢ cient ownership al-
location.
The problem that we study is relevant in many elds. For instance, temporary
partnerships between rms are often formed in the context of R&D activities.1
As has been pointed out by Aghion and Tirole (1994, p. 1205), managing in-
novation properly is one of the most important challenges faced by developed
economies.They explore the relationship between a customer and a research
unit who can both invest in order to increase the probability of making an inno-
vation. Only the customer can commercialize the innovation; i.e., the customers
valuation is positive, while the research units valuation is zero. Even though
the innovation should thus be owned by the customer ex post, it can be optimal
to initially allocate ownership to the research unit in order to improve its invest-
ment incentives. We generalize their model, such that both parties may have a
positive valuation, and we study in detail under what circumstances ownership
by the low-valuation party can be optimal. Moreover, we allow for shared own-
ership, as it is typically observed in research joint ventures.2 Another example
where our analysis is very relevant in practice are public-private partnerships.
Such partnerships between the public sector and a private rm are often formed
to realize a specic infrastructure project such as a road, a hospital, an airport,
or a prison.3 Who should own the facility used to supply a public service? The
1On R&D alliances, see e.g. Pisano (1989) and Oxley and Sampson (2004). Bleeke and
Ernst (1995) nd that in their sample the median life span of an alliance is seven years, and
Chan et al. (1997) report an average life span of about ve years.
2Cf. Santamaría et al. (2009), who point out that technological joint ventures are legal
entities in which equity ownership is shared between rms.
3Akintoye (2009) points out that public-private partnerships can be described as a con-
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public sector and the private rm may have di¤erent ex post valuations. Again,
while the large-valuation party should be the owner ex post, it may be optimal to
give (a share of) the initial ownership to the low-valuation party to enhance its
investment incentives. We analyze how the nature of investments (i.e., whether
or not the investments are embodied in the physical asset) inuences the optimal
ownership arrangement.
We build on the property rights approach to the theory of the rm, which
is the leading application of the incomplete contracting paradigm developed by
Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995).4 The
incomplete contracts approach has turned out to be very helpful to discuss the
pros and cons of ownership structures, and it is by now widely regarded as
one of the most important advances made in microeconomics in the past three
decades.5 In the property rights approach to the theory of the rm, most contri-
butions make the plausible assumptions that partners who work together tend to
be symmetrically informed, investment incentives are important, and real-world
contracts are typically incomplete. We also make these assumptions. Yet, so far
the incomplete contracts literature is usually focused on sole ownership by one
party (the make-or-buydecision), while it remains rather silent on the issue
of shared ownership. This is a major shortcoming, as was already pointed out
by Holmström (1999, p. 86), who emphasized that joint ventures (and shared
ownership, more generally) have always been an important part of the corporate
landscape.6 Moreover, in most papers in the incomplete contracting literature,
tractual agreement of shared ownership between a public agency and a private company.For
recent work on public-private partnerships, see e.g. Desrieux (2009), Saussier et al. (2009),
Hoppe and Schmitz (2013), Greco (2015), Li et al. (2015), Deng et al. (2016), and Buso et
al. (2017). Sarmento and Renneboog (2016) report that infrastructure construction often takes
four to ve years.
4For a vivid discussion of the incomplete contracting methodology, see Tirole (1999).
5The incomplete contracts approach has been successfully applied in elds such as organiza-
tional economics, corporate nance, industrial organization, and privatization theory. Andrei
Shleifer has recently emphasized that the Grossman-Hart incomplete contracts approach rep-
resents perhaps the most inuential advance in economic theory in the last thirty years(see
the back cover of Aghion et al., 2016).
6In their recent literature survey, Gattai and Natale (2017) point out that worldwide and
in many sectors, joint ventures are a very common form of inter-rm collaborations. On the
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the ex post allocation of ownership does not matter. Furthermore, the analysis is
usually focused on investments in human capital, while investments in physical
capital are typically mentioned only briey. It is our aim to broaden the property
rights theory in order to cover these omissions. In particular, we demonstrate
that central elements of the property rights approach (contractual incomplete-
ness, relationship-specic investments, and renegotiation) can be fruitfully com-
bined with the denition of ownership employed in the partnership dissolution
literature.7
The main novel insights of the present paper are as follows. First, we clarify
the role that the nature of investments plays for the optimal ownership arrange-
ment. When (in line with the standard property rights approach) we consider
only sole ownership by one of the two parties, then the party with the larger
valuation should already have initial ownership if the investments are in human
capital, while the party with the smaller valuation should be the initial owner
if the investments are in physical capital, given that the parties have the same
investment costs. Furthermore, in the case of physical capital investments, initial
ownership by the low-valuation party can be optimal even when its investment
technology is less e¢ cient than that of the high-valuation party. Second, when
we allow for shared ownership, then sole ownership by one party is never opti-
mal if the parties have the same valuations or the same investment technologies.
Moreover, if the parties have the same investment costs but di¤er in their val-
uations, then the initial ownership share of the large-valuation party should be
relatively large in the case of human capital investments, but relatively small
in the case of physical-capital investments. Third, it is well-known that joint
ownership in the sense of bilateral veto power is never optimal in the case of
relevance of shared ownership, see also Bunting (2016) and Fosfuri et al. (2017).
7See the discussion of the related literature below. The denition of ownership in Grossman
and Hart (1986) is very useful in some contexts such as vertical integration, but it has turned out
to be too narrow for other purposes. As pointed out, the traditional property rights approach
cannot account for shared ownership, which is discussed in the present paper. Moreover, the
traditional approach has problems explaining publicly traded corporations. Specically, as has
recently been emphasized by Zingales (2016, p. 147), Starting from the original version of
the theory, it is a bit hard to explain what it means to separate ownership from control, since
ownership is dened as control.
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human capital investments, while in standard property rights models it can be
optimal when investments are in physical capital.8 We show that the latter result
crucially relies on the usual assumption that there is only sole ownership by one
of the parties. When we allow for shared ownership, then bilateral veto power
cannot improve investment incentives, regardless of the nature of investments.
Related literature. Our main research question is somewhat reminiscent of the
partnership dissolution problem that was rst studied by Cramton et al. (1987),
who consider a variant of Myerson and Satterthwaites (1983) well-known con-
tribution.9 However, in this literature the partiesvaluations are assumed to be
private information and unrestrainedly complex mechanisms are allowed, which
contrasts with the incomplete contracts approach that we follow in the present
paper. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have demonstrated that ex post e¢ -
ciency cannot always be attained by voluntary bargaining under asymmetric in-
formation when initially one of the parties is the sole owner of the asset, while the
partnership dissolution literature shows that ex post e¢ ciency can be achieved if
initial ownership is more evenly shared between the parties.10 The present paper
is complementary to this literature, since we give a di¤erent explanation for the
optimality of shared ownership.
In the complete contracting literature, some papers such as Bhattacharyya
and Lafontaine (1995) explain the optimality of revenue sharing contracts in the
context of a double-sided moral hazard problem (i.e., while the parties are sym-
metrically informed at the contracting stage, there are post-contractual hidden
actions). This literature is di¤erent from the incomplete contracts approach, be-
cause in a complete contracting world the Coase Theorem applies and ownership
8Investments in physical capital were briey discussed by Hart and Moore (1990). See also
the recent contribution by Gattai and Natale (2016).
9See also Segal and Whinston (2013) for a recent survey on property rights encompassing
both the partnership dissolution literature and the incomplete contracting literature. Note
that they also use a broader denition of ownership than Grossman and Hart (1986).
10See also Schmitz (2002) for a variant of the partnership dissolution problem where a partys
privately known valuation is inuenced by prior investments made by this party. In contrast,
in the present paper we follow the incomplete contracting literature in assuming that the
partners are symmetrically informed and we allow investments to have external e¤ects on the
other partys payo¤.
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does not matter (see Hart, 1995).11 Furthermore, Tamada and Tsai (2007, 2014)
have also studied the termination of projects, albeit in a complete contracting
framework with moral hazard and limited liability where ownership does not play
a role.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In the following section, the model is introduced and the rst-best benchmark
is presented. In Section 3, the second-best solution is derived. In Section 4,
only sole ownership by one of the parties can be specied ex ante, so we analyze
whether or not the large-valuation party should already be the owner at the ex
ante stage. In Section 5 we allow for shared ownership. Section 6 studies joint
ownership in the sense of bilateral veto power. Concluding remarks follow in
Section 7. Some technical details are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a partnership between two risk-neutral parties, A and B. Initially,
party A owns the share r0 2 [0; 1] of an asset that can be traded at date 2, while
party B owns the share 1   r0. The valuation of party i for the entire asset is
given by vi > 0. At date 1, the two parties simultaneously choose observable
but non-contractible investment levels a  0 and b  0 that can improve the
productivity of the asset.12 The investment costs are given by 1
2
cAa
2 and 1
2
cBb
2,
11In contrast, in the partnership dissolution literature ownership determines the parties
default payo¤s (just as in the property rights theory), and the parties are privately informed
at the contracting stage. As has been pointed out by La¤ont and Martimort (2002, p. 58), the
fact that the parties did not write a contract before the information was realized can actually
be interpreted as a form of incomplete contracting. Indeed, it is well-known that Myerson and
Satterthwaites (1983) impossibility theorem does not hold if a contract can be signed before
the private information is realized (see dAspremont and Gérard-Varet, 1979).
12Note that alternatively one might consider investments that increase the valuations. Such
a model has been studied by Schmitz (2002) and is closer to the hold-up literature that does
not address asset ownership (cf. Rogerson, 1992). In contrast, the current model is focused on
property rights. Note that in Aghion and Tiroles (1994) management of innovation model and
in Besley and Ghataks (2001) public goods model the partiesvaluations are also independent
of the investments.
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respectively, where ci > 0.13 Following the incomplete contracting approach, we
assume that at date 0 only the initial ownership structure r0 is contractible.14
However, the ownership structure may be renegotiated at date 2.
If the parties reach an agreement at date 2, then they dissolve their partner-
ship in an ex post e¢ cient way, such that the party with the larger valuation
gets the entire asset. Moreover, there is an amicable divorce, i.e., the party
with the larger valuation will be able to make full use not only of its own invest-
ment, but also of the other partys investment. Thus, the joint date-2 surplus is
maxfvA; vBg(a+ b).
Following the property rights approach, there is symmetric information and
the date-2 negotiations are modeled by the regular Nash bargaining solution,
such that a date-2 agreement will always be reached. Yet, the division of the
date-2 surplus depends on the default payo¤s that the parties would get in the
absence of an agreement. Party As and party Bs date-2 default payo¤s are
dA(a; bjr0) = vAr0(a+ Bb) and dB(a; bjr0) = vB(1  r0)(b+ Aa), respectively.15
Specically, suppose that party A is the sole owner of the asset (r0 = 1).
When no agreement is reached, party Bs payo¤ is zero, since party B does not
have the asset. Party A can make full use of its own investment a, but it can use
only a fraction B of party Bs investment. In the wording of the property rights
theory, this means that the fraction B of party Bs investment is embodied in
13As it is often done in the related literature, we consider quadratic investment costs in order
to simplify the exposition. Yet, qualitatively our results also hold when the investment costs
are linear and the investmentsreturns are concave.
14In addition, the parties can agree on a lump-sum up-front payment in order to distribute
the anticipated total surplus according to their ex ante bargaining powers.
15Note that if we normalize the model such that 0  a+ b  1, then we can interpret a+ b
as the probability that an innovation is made. If party A is a research unit and party B is a
customer and A = 1, our model somewhat resembles Aghion and Tiroles (1994) management
of innovation model, where the partiesvaluations of the innovation are given by vA = 0 and
vB = V > 0. Observe that in contrast to their setup, we allow for horizontal research joint
ventures where each party may have a positive valuation. Moreover, our model di¤ers from
Aghion and Tiroles (1994) work because our focus is on shared ownership and we allow for
investments in human capital as well as in physical capital. In contrast, Aghion and Tirole
(1994) study the implications of their assumption that party A is cash-constrained, which we
do not make in the present paper.
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the physical capital (so that it can always be used by whoever is the owner of
the asset), while the fraction 1  B of party Bs investment is embodied in his
human capital. In particular, the human capital investment can be interpreted
as acquisition of asset-specic know-how that party B will not disclose to party
A if no agreement at date 2 is reached.16 Analogously, if party B is the sole
owner of the asset (r0 = 0), then in the absence of a date-2 agreement party As
payo¤ is zero, while party B can make use of his own investment and of a fraction
A of party As investment. In the case of shared ownership (0 < r0 < 1), when
no agreement is reached party A owns the share r0 and party B owns the share
1  r0 of the asset.17
Note that following the incomplete contracts approach we assume through-
out that the investments are asset-specic and non-contractible, regardless of
whether they are embodied in the investors human capital or in the physical
asset. In particular, the investments can be interpreted as e¤ort exerted in order
to improve the protability of the asset. Technological improvements of the as-
set are embodied in the physical capital, while ideas how to best commercialize
the asset are examples of investments that are embodied in the partieshuman
capital.18 The investment costs cA and cB reect the abilities of the two parties.
Observe also that in our model prots are non-contractible, while asset ownership
provides parties with income streams.19
16Thus, the acquired know-how is of the eye-opener nature discussed by Tirole (2015);
i.e., when an agreement is reached then disclosure immediately enables the other party to
make full use of the know-how. In contrast, when no agreement is reached, the parties do not
cooperate and thus no know-how is transferred (cf. Besley and Ghatak, 2001, for a related
discussion). Investments in transferable know-how have also been studied by Rosenkranz and
Schmitz (2003). Yet, in their model the asset is a public good that can be used by both parties
simultaneously. On know-how transmission in a di¤erent setup, see also Tsai and Kung (2011).
17Observe that given risk-neutrality, shared ownership is equivalent to stochastic ownership;
i.e., when no agreement is reached at date 2, then party A will be the owner with probability
r0 and party B will be the owner with probability 1   r0. Note that when the valuations are
uncertain ex ante, stochastic ownership can be implemented by giving one of the parties the
right to buy the asset at an ex ante determined price.
18Of course, in addition to the non-contractible investments in practice there may also be
contractible (e.g., nancial) investments, which we do not model explicitly in order to simplify
the exposition.
19While this assumption was not made in Grossman and Hart (1986), similar assumptions
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The rst-best benchmark. In a rst-best world, the two parties would always agree
to give the asset at date 2 to the party with the larger valuation.20 Moreover,
the rst-best investment levels aFB and bFB which maximize the total surplus
maxfvA; vBg(a+ b)  12cAa2   12cBb2 are characterized by
aFB = maxfvA; vBg=cA;
bFB = maxfvA; vBg=cB:
Note that in line with the standard property rights approach, initial ownership
r0 does not matter in a rst-best world.
3 The second-best solution
Following the property rights theory as synthesized by Hart (1995), the outcome
of the date-2 negotiations is given by the regular Nash bargaining solution, where
the default payo¤s constitute the threatpoint.21 Thus, the parties agree on a
transfer payment such that at date 2 each party gets its default payo¤ (which
it would get in case of disagreement) plus half of the renegotiation surplus (i.e.,
the additional surplus that is generated by an amicable divorce).
Hence, given the initial ownership structure r0 2 [0; 1], party As date-2 payo¤
reads
uA(a; bjr0) = dA(a; bjr0) + 1
2
(a; bjr0)
and party Bs date-2 payo¤ is
uB(a; bjr0) = dB(a; bjr0) + 1
2
(a; bjr0);
have often been made in the subsequent literature, see e.g. Holmström and Milgrom (1994),
Stein (1997), Aghion et al. (2016, Part 2), and the recent work by Su (2017). Note that our
denition of ownership is the same as in the partnership dissolution literature discussed above.
20This property of our model is similar to the partnership dissolution literature. As a conse-
quence, when it turns out that ex ante shared ownership is strictly better than sole ownership
in a second-best world, then this must be due to incentive considerations only. Alternatively,
one might also consider a model in which it is ex post e¢ cient to share ownership due to com-
plementarities between the two parties. Yet, in such a model it would be less surprising to nd
that the parties might agree on shared ownership already at the outset of their relationship.
21See Muthoo (1999) for an excellent exposition of bargaining theory.
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where the renegotiation surplus (a; bjr0) is given by
(a; bjr0) = maxfvA; vBg(a+ b)  dA(a; bjr0)  dB(a; bjr0):
Let us now analyze the partiesdate-1 investment incentives. Given the initial
ownership structure r0, the parties anticipate that at date 2 party As payo¤will
be uA(a; bjr0) and party Bs payo¤ will be uB(a; bjr0). Thus, at date 1 party A
chooses the investment level
a(r0) = arg max
a
fuA(a; bjr0)  1
2
cAa
2g
= arg max
a
fvAr0(a+ Bb) + 1
2
[maxfvA; vBg(a+ b)  vAr0(a+ Bb)
  vB(1  r0)(b+ Aa)]  1
2
cAa
2g;
while party B chooses the investment level
b(r0) = arg max
b
fuB(a; bjr0)  1
2
cBb
2g
= arg max
b
fvB(1  r0)(b+ Aa) + 1
2
[maxfvA; vBg(a+ b)  vAr0(a+ Bb)
  vB(1  r0)(b+ Aa)]  1
2
cBb
2g:
As a consequence, the investment levels that the two parties choose at date
1 are given by
a(r0) =
1
2cA
[maxfvA; vBg+ vAr0   vB(1  r0)A] ;
b(r0) =
1
2cB
[maxfvA; vBg   vAr0B + vB(1  r0)] :
Inspection of these investment levels immediately leads to the following result.
Lemma 1 (i) Regardless of the ownership structure r0 2 [0; 1], there is never
overinvestment with regard to the rst-best benchmark; i.e., a(r0)  aFB, b(r0) 
bFB.
(ii) A partys investment is always increasing in its ownership share; i.e.,
a(r0) is an increasing function and b(r0) is a decreasing function.
At date 0, the anticipated total surplus level given ownership structure r0 2
[0; 1] is given by
S(a(r0); b(r0)) = maxfvA; vBg[a(r0) + b(r0)]  1
2
cAa(r0)
2   1
2
cBb(r0)
2:
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In the following sections, we analyze how the initial ownership structure r0 should
be chosen in order to maximize the total surplus S(a(r0); b(r0)). Note that since
there is always underinvestment with regard to the rst-best solution and the
total surplus is concave in the investments, a change of the ownership structure
that induces both parties to invest more is always desirable.
4 A-ownership versus B-ownership
In this section, following most contributions to the property rights theory, we
assume that at date 0 the parties can agree on r0 2 f0; 1g only. Thus, we conne
our attention to sole ownership, either by party A (i.e., r0 = 1) or by party
B (i.e., r0 = 0). Shared ownership (0 < r0 < 1) will be analyzed in the next
section.22
Suppose rst that for e¢ ciency reasons it does not matter who is the nal
owner of the asset, because both parties have the same valuation. Then the
following result holds.
Proposition 1 Suppose only sole ownership is feasible, r0 2 f0; 1g. Consider
vA = vB and A = B. Then at date 0 the party with the more e¢ cient invest-
ment technology should be the owner; i.e., party A should be the owner if cA < cB
and party B should be the owner if cB < cA.
Proof. Suppose vA = vB =: v and A = B =: . Then under A-ownership
the investment levels are a(1) = v=cA and b(1) = (1   )v=2cB, while under
B-ownership the investment levels are a(0) = (1   )v=2cA and b(0) = v=cB.
It is straightforward to check that A-ownership is better than B-ownership, i.e.
S(a(1); b(1))  S(a(0); b(0)), whenever cA  cB holds. 
In other words, everything else equal, the party with the better investment
technology should be the owner. Proposition 1 thus replicates a central insight
of the property rights approach to the theory of the rm (cf. Hart, 1995) in our
22Following prominent contributions to the property rights theory such as Hart (1995) and
Hart et al. (1997), in the propositions below we focus on specic cases that best convey the
economic intuition. See the Appendix for the general conditions under which A-ownership is
strictly better than B-ownership. These conditions underlie the four gures displayed in this
section.
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setup. Intuitively, recall from Lemma 1(ii) that ownership increases a partys
investment incentives. Hence, in order to make the most of the superior in-
vestment technology, the party with the smaller investment costs should be the
owner. Note that this result holds regardless of whether the investments are in
human capital (A = B = 0) or in physical capital (A = B = 1).
Next, let us explore the impact of the partiesvaluations.
Proposition 2 Suppose only sole ownership is feasible, r0 2 f0; 1g.
(i) Suppose cA = cB and let A = B = 0, so that the investments are in
human capital. Then the party who is the ex post e¢ cient nal owner of the good
should also be the initial owner; i.e., at date 0 A-ownership is optimal if vA > vB
and B-ownership is optimal if vB > vA.
(ii) Suppose cA = cB and let A = B = 1, so that the investments are
embodied in the physical capital. Then the party who is the ex post e¢ cient nal
owner of the good should not be the initial owner; i.e., at date 0 B-ownership is
optimal if vA > vB and A-ownership is optimal if vB > vA.
Proof. (i) Suppose cA = cB =: c and A = B = 0. Then under A-ownership the
investment levels are a(1) = [maxfvA; vBg+ vA]=2c and b(1) = maxfvA; vBg=2c,
while under B-ownership the investment levels are a(0) = maxfvA; vBg=2c and
b(0) = [maxfvA; vBg+ vB] =2c. One can easily verify that A-ownership is better
than B-ownership, i.e. S(a(1); b(1))  S(a(0); b(0)), whenever vA  vB holds.
(ii) Suppose cA = cB =: c and A = B = 1. Under A-ownership the
investments are a(1) = [maxfvA; vBg+vA]=2c and b(1) = [maxfvA; vBg vA]=2c,
while under B-ownership the investment levels are a(0) = [maxfvA; vBg vB]=2c
and b(0) = [maxfvA; vBg+ vB] =2c. One can now check that A-ownership is
better than B-ownership whenever vB  vA. 
Part (i) of Proposition 2 is not surprising. Given that both parties have
the same investment technology, the party with the larger valuation should be
the owner. Yet, note that this result holds when the investments are in human
capital (which is the case most often studied in the property rights literature).
In contrast, if the investments are in physical capital, then according to part
(ii) of Proposition 2, the party with the smaller valuation should be the initial
owner. At rst sight, this result might be surprising. The intuition behind
12
the result can be explained as follows. If the investments are embodied in the
physical capital and the party with the larger valuation is the initial owner, then
it can make full use of the other partys investment without reaching a date-2
agreement. Thus, the high-valuation party has no reason to negotiate with the
other party at date 2. In anticipation, the low-valuation party will not make any
investments. Yet, if the party with the smaller valuation is the initial owner,
then renegotiation of the ownership structure will take place at date 2. Since the
party with the smaller valuation will get half of the renegotiation surplus, it will
make a strictly positive investment.23 As a consequence, even though ownership
by the high-valuation party is ex post e¢ cient, at date 0 ownership should be
given to the low-valuation party.24
As an illustration, consider Figures 1 and 2. Observe that the gures show the
optimal initial ownership structure depending on vA and cA, given that vB = 1
and cB = 1. Hence, in the region above the dashed line, party B has the better
investment technology. Figure 1 depicts the case of investments in human capital,
while Figure 2 depicts the case of investments in physical capital.
23Moreover, note that the total investments are always equal to maxfvA; vBg=2c. Thus,
given convexity of the investment cost functions, the total surplus is larger if the investments
are more evenly distributed between the two parties (i.e., if the low-valuation party makes a
strictly positive investment). An analogous argument would hold if the investment costs were
linear and the investmentsreturns were concave.
24See Huberman and Kahn (1988) for other examples where parties ex ante could sign an ex
post e¢ cient contract, but instead prefer to agree on a (seemingly) suboptimal contract that
will be renegotiated later on. For instance, bank loans often stipulate that assets will be taken
over by the bank if the borrower does not repay. Yet, banks are usually less e¢ cient as managers
of the assets, hence the threat of takeover is not carried out and loans are renegotiated instead.
See also Maskin and Moores (1999, Section 4) result according to which in a setting with ex
ante contractible trade it may be optimal to write no contract when the sellers investment
improves the buyers valuation and there is ex post e¢ cient renegotiation.
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0 2
0
2
cB
vB
cA
vA
B‐ownership
A‐ownership
Figure 1. The optimal initial ownership structure when the investments are in human
capital (A = B = 0).
0 2
0
2
cB
cA
vAvB
B‐ownership
A‐ownership
Figure 2. The optimal initial ownership structure when the investments are in physical
capital (A = B = 1).
If vA = vB, then in line with Proposition 1, in both gures A-ownership is
optimal when cA < cB and B-ownership is optimal when cA > cB. However,
consider now values of vA that are smaller than vB, so that ownership by party
B is ex post e¢ cient. In the case of human capital investments (Figure 1), initial
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B-ownership is optimal when cA = cB.25 In contrast, in the case of physical
capital investments (Figure 2), initial ownership by party A is optimal when
cA = cB. Note that initial A-ownership is even optimal for some values of cA
that are larger than cB. Thus, in the case of physical capital investments, A-
ownership can be optimal at date 0 even when party A has both the smaller
valuation and the less e¢ cient investment technology.
So far, we have focused on cases in which either all investments were in
human capital or all investments were in physical capital. Let us now study the
role played by the nature of the investments in more detail.
As long as A = B, the previous results generalize in a straightforward
way to the intermediate case in which both partiesinvestments are partially in
human capital and partially in physical capital (i.e., 0 < A = B < 1). This
case is illustrated in Figure 3.
cA
0 2
0
2
cB
vB vA
A‐ownership
B‐ownership
Figure 3. The optimal initial ownership structure when the investments are partially
in human capital and partially in physical capital (A = B = 1=2).
Next, let us consider the case where one party can invest in human capital,
while the other party can invest in physical capital.
25Of course, B-ownership remains optimal when cA > cB . However, note that B-ownership
is also optimal for some values of cA that are smaller than cB ; i.e., the fact that party B
has the larger valuation can overcompensate the fact that party A has the better investment
technology.
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Proposition 3 Suppose only sole ownership is feasible, r0 2 f0; 1g. Consider
cA = cB and let A = 0, B = 1, so that party As investment is in human capital
and party Bs investment is in physical capital. Then initial ownership by party
B is always optimal, regardless of the partiesvaluations.
Proof. Suppose cA = cB =: c and A = 0, B = 1. Then under A-ownership
the investment levels are a(1) = [maxfvA; vBg+vA]=2c and b(1) = [maxfvA; vBg 
vA]=2c, while underB-ownership the investment levels are a(0) = maxfvA; vBg=2c
and b(0) = [maxfvA; vBg+ vB] =2c. It is straightforward to verify that B-
ownership is always better than A-ownership, i.e. S(a(1); b(1)) < S(a(0); b(0))
holds. 
Intuitively, a party that makes investments in physical capital needs more
protection from hold-up than a party that invests in human capital.26 Suppose
that party A (who invests in human capital) is the initial owner. Then party A
can make full use of party Bs investment even when no agreement at date 2 is
reached, since party Bs investment is embodied in the physical capital owned
by party A. For this reason, it is particularly important to improve party Bs
investment incentives, so initial ownership by party B turns out to be optimal.
Proposition 3 has been derived under the assumption that both partiesin-
vestment technologies are equally e¢ cient (cA = cB). As is illustrated in Figure
4, ownership by party A will become optimal if party As investment technology
is much more e¢ cient than party Bs investment technology, i.e., if cA is much
smaller than cB.
26Zhao and Zhu (1998) study international joint ventures in China and nd that foreign
entrants tend to have a large ownership share in industries with a high skill intensity. To the
extent that the foreign entrant mainly provides monetary investments in the physical capital,
the empirical nding is consistent with our result that foreign ownership is desirable when it
is important that local workers invest in their human capital.
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cA
0 2
0
2
vA
cB
vB
A‐ownership
B‐ownership
Figure 4. The optimal initial ownership structure when party A invests in human
capital and party B invests in physical capital (A = 0, B = 1).
5 Shared Ownership
While the property rights approach to the theory of the rm is usually focused on
sole ownership of an asset by one party, the literature on partnership dissolution
considers shared ownership, where each party initially owns a fraction of the
asset. Of course, also in the latter literature sole ownership by the high-valuation
party is ex post e¢ cient; yet, shared initial ownership facilitates reaching an
agreement under asymmetric information. We now investigate whether shared
ownership (0 < r0 < 1) may also be benecial in the present context, where in
line with the property rights approach information is symmetric, but where the
provision of investment incentives is a major concern.
Proposition 4 Suppose shared ownership is feasible.
(i) Suppose vA = vB. Then at date 0 shared ownership (0 < r0 < 1) is
optimal. Party As optimal initial ownership share r0 is decreasing in cA and in
B, while it is increasing in cB and in A. In particular, if A = B, then at
date 0 party As optimal ownership share is r0 =
cB
cA+cB
.
(ii) Suppose cA = cB and let A = B = 0, so that the investments are in
human capital. At date 0, shared ownership (0 < r0 < 1) is optimal. Party As
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optimal initial ownership share r0 is increasing in vA and decreasing in vB.
(iii) Suppose cA = cB and let A = B = 1, so that the investments are
embodied in the physical capital. At date 0, shared ownership (0 < r0 < 1) is
optimal. Party As optimal initial ownership share r0 is decreasing in vA and
increasing in vB.
Proof. (i) Let vA = vB =: v. Then party A invests a(r0) = [(1 + r0)v  
(1   r0)vA]=2cA and party B invests b(r0) = [(2   r0)v   r0vB]=2cB. It is
straightforward to check that the total surplus S(a(r0); b(r0)) is maximized when
r0 =
(1 + A)
2cB
(1 + B)2cA + (1 + A)2cB
:
The claims made in the proposition then follow immediately.
(ii) Let cA = cB =: c and A = B = 0. Then the investment levels are
a(r0) = [maxfvA; vBg+ vAr0] =2c and b(r0) = [maxfvA; vBg+ vB(1  r0)] =2c.
One can easily verify that the total surplus S(a(r0); b(r0)) is maximized when
r0 =
8<:
vAvB
v2A+v
2
B
if vA  vB
1  vAvB
v2A+v
2
B
if vA > vB,
which implies the claims made in the proposition.
(iii) Let cA = cB =: c and A = B = 1. Then partyAs investment level is
a(r0) = [maxfvA; vBg+ vAr0   vB(1  r0)] =2c and party Bs investment level is
b(r0) = [maxfvA; vBg   vAr0 + vB(1  r0)] =2c. One can easily check that the to-
tal surplus S(a(r0); b(r0)) is maximized when r0 = vBvA+vB . Thus, the proposition
follows immediately. 
Note that in each of the three cases in the proposition, shared ownership
is better than sole ownership, since shared ownership allows to spread the in-
vestment incentives more evenly, which is desirable given the convexity of the
investment costs.27 Other than that, Proposition 4 echoes the main insights that
were gained in the preceding section. Specically, Proposition 4(i) says that if
the parties have the same valuation, such that it does not matter who is the nal
owner of the asset, then the party with the better investment technology (i.e.,
27It should be noted that smoothing out ownership across parties is not only desirable
when investment costs are convex, but also when investment costs are linear and the returns
of the investments are concave.
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the party with smaller investment costs) should have a larger share of the date-0
ownership. In the symmetric case where both parties have the same investment
costs and the same fractions of human capital investments, each party should
own 50% of the asset. Moreover, when the parties have the same investment
costs but di¤er in their valuations, then parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 4 show
that party As share of the initial ownership increases in its valuation vA if the
investments are in human capital, while it decreases in vA if the investments are
in physical capital.
0 2
0
0.5
1
vA
vB
cA = cB = 1
cA = 2, cB = 1
cA = 0.5, cB = 1
r0*
Figure 5. Party As optimal initial ownership share r0 when the investments are in
human capital (A = B = 0).
Figure 5 illustrates the case of human capital investments, while Figure 6
depicts the case of investments in physical capital. The gures show party As
optimal initial ownership share r0 as a function of its valuation vA, where vB is
equal to 1. In addition to the case in which both parties have the same costs,
the gures also illustrate that cost di¤erences interact in a straightforward way
with valuation di¤erences in determining the optimal ownership structure.
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0 2
0
0.5
1
r0*
vA
vB
cA = cB = 1cA = 2, cB = 1
cA = 0.5, cB = 1
Figure 6. Party As optimal initial ownership share r0 when the investments are in
physical capital (A = B = 1).
Note also that sole ownership (i.e., a corner solution) can be optimal only in
very asymmetric cases. For instance, in Figure 6 sole ownership by party A is
optimal in the case cA = 1=2, cB = 1 when party As valuation is much smaller
than party Bs valuation (vA  1=3, vB = 1). More generally, one can show the
following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose shared ownership is feasible.
(i) Sole ownership by party A is optimal (r0 = 1) if vA < vB and
cA
cB
<
Av
2
B + (1  A)vAvB   v2A
v2B + 2BvAvB + 
2
Bv
2
A
:
(ii) Sole ownership by party B is optimal (r0 = 0) if vA > vB and
cA
cB
>
(vA + AvB)
2
(vA   vB)(vB + BvA) :
Proof. See the Appendix. 
6 Joint ownership vs. shared ownership
In the property rights approach to the theory of the rm, joint ownershipof an
asset usually means that each party has veto power over the use of the asset (see
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Hart andMoore, 1990, p. 1132); i.e., both partiesdefault payo¤s are zero. Hence,
joint ownership is di¤erent from shared ownership.28 Hart and Moore (1990)
have shown that when the parties invest only in their human capital, then joint
ownership can never be optimal. In contrast, when the parties invest in physical
capital, then in traditional property rights models there are circumstances under
which joint ownership is better than sole ownership. However, we now show
that joint ownership can never be better than shared ownership with a suitably
chosen r0 2 [0; 1].
Proposition 6 (i) If we restrict attention to sole ownership, r0 2 f0; 1g, then
joint ownership is never optimal when the investments are in human capital
(A = B = 0), while joint ownership is optimal when the investments are in
physical capital (A = B = 1) and cA = cB.
(ii) If we allow for shared ownership, then the total surplus attained under
r0 =
vB
vA+vB
is at least as large as the total surplus attained under joint ownership.
Proof. Under joint ownership the default payo¤s are zero, hence the analysis in
Section 3 immediately implies that the investment levels are given by
aJ =
1
2cA
maxfvA; vBg;
bJ =
1
2cB
maxfvA; vBg:
Note that there is always underinvestment with regard to the rst-best bench-
mark.
(i) Suppose that the investments are in human capital (A = B = 0). It
is straightforward to see that then a(r0)  aJ and b(r0)  bJ must hold. Since
a(1) > aJ and b(0) > bJ , sole ownership is strictly better than joint owner-
ship. Now suppose that the investments are in physical capital (A = B = 1)
and cA = cB =: c. In this case, a(1) = [maxfvA; vBg+ vA] =2c > aJ and
28Observe that the notion of joint ownership cannot distinguish between, say, a joint venture
in which both parties have equal ownership shares and a joint venture in which one partys
ownership share is 80 percent and the other partys ownership share is 20 percent. Desai et
al. (2004) argue that while common sense might suggest that joint ventures are typically 50%
owned by each of two partners, in their empirical study of American multinational rms they
nd that in fact only 41% of all a¢ liates that were partially owned by American rms had
between 40% and 60% American parent ownership in 1994.
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b(1) = [maxfvA; vBg   vA] =2c < aJ : One can easily verify that S(aJ ; bJ)  
S(a(1); b(1)) = v2A=4c > 0, hence joint ownership is strictly better than A-
ownership. Analogously, one can show that S(aJ ; bJ) S(a(0); b(0)) = v2B=4c > 0,
hence joint ownership is also strictly better than B-ownership.
(ii) Suppose that r0 = vBvA+vB . If the investments are in physical capital
(A = B = 1), then a(r0) = aJ and b(r0) = bJ , so the total surplus levels
under shared ownership and under joint ownership are equal. Otherwise, shared
ownership yields a strictly larger total surplus than joint ownership, since a(r0) 
aJ = vAvB
vA+vB
(1  A)=2cA > 0 and b(r0)  bJ = vAvBvA+vB (1  B)=2cB > 0 hold. 
Part (i) of Proposition 5 replicates the well-known insights regarding the op-
timality of joint ownership in traditional property rights models where shared
ownership is neglected. When the investments are in human capital, then moving
from sole ownership to joint ownership simply reduces the investment incentives
of the original owner, while it leaves the incentives of the other party unchanged.
In contrast, when the investments are in physical capital, replacing sole owner-
ship by joint ownership can increase the total surplus. The reason is that joint
ownership reduces the original owners investment incentives, but it increases the
other partys incentives (since investments by the other party no longer improve
the owners default payo¤). However, part (ii) of the proposition shows that if
we take shared ownership into account, then we can nd an ownership share r0
such that joint ownership can never yield a larger total surplus, regardless of
the nature of investments. Hence, our analysis casts doubt on explanations of
joint ownership that are based on investments in physical capital.29 If we want
to explain why parties might sometimes want to block each other from using an
asset, it is necessary to introduce other elements such as asymmetric information
into the property rights model.30
29See also Gattai and Natale (2016) for other reasons why investments in physical capital
may not be convincing explanations of joint ownership.
30Schmitz (2006) has extended the property rights apporach to the case where a party may
have private information about its default payo¤. See also Gattai and Natale (2017) for a
recent literature survey on joint ownership.
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7 Conclusion
This paper provides an incomplete contracts perspective on shared ownership
and the partnership dissolution problem. In line with the established property
rights approach to the theory of the rm, the party with the better investment
technology (i.e., the party with smaller investment costs) should be the initial
owner if only sole ownership is feasible and the parties have the same valuation
for the asset. However, when the partiesvaluations di¤er, then the optimal own-
ership structure crucially depends on the nature of investments. In particular,
we have found that when the investments are in physical capital, then the party
with the smaller valuation should be the initial owner if only sole ownership is
possible. Moreover, in line with the partnership dissolution literature, we have
found that shared ownership (which is usually neglected in the property rights
literature) is often optimal. Yet, the reason for the optimality of shared owner-
ship is di¤erent. So far, the partnership dissolution literature was concerned with
achieving ex post e¢ ciency under asymmetric information, while we have instead
focused on the provision of investment incentives in an incomplete contracting
framework with symmetric information. Furthermore, we have shown that even
when investments are (fully or partially) in physical capital, joint ownership in
the sense of bilateral veto power is never optimal. Hence, to the extent that bi-
lateral veto power is observed in practice, other explanations such as asymmetric
information are required.
In future research, the simple model studied in the present paper could be
extended in several directions. For example, one could introduce private infor-
mation about the valuations, bringing the model closer to the partnership dis-
solution literature.31 Alternatively, one could retain the assumption that there
is symmetric information but allow for other sources of ex post ine¢ ciencies.32
31In the incomplete contracts literature, it is usually assumed that the parties are symmet-
rically informed. However, cf. Schmitz (2006), Goldlücke and Schmitz (2014), and Su (2017)
who study implications of private information in the property rights approach to the theory
of the rm. See also Lau (2008) and Goltsman (2011) on asymmetric information and the
hold-up problem.
32Hart (1995, p. 88) suggests two alternatives to asymmetric information. First, the parties
might simply not get alongat date 2, so the negotiations break down with a small probability.
Cf. Schmitz (2015) for such a model of bargaining frictions in a public-good context. See also
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Moreover, while following almost all contributions to the partnership dissolution
literature we have considered the case of a single asset, it might be worthwhile
to extend the model to the case of multiple assets.33 Finally, it seems to be
an interesting avenue for future research to explore the relationship between the
nature of investments and the allocation of ownership in eld studies and to test
the theoretical predictions in laboratory experiments.34
Mori (2017) for a recent model of rm boundaries and haggling in the tradition of transaction
cost economics. Second, there may be behavioral reasons for ex post ine¢ ciencies. See Hart
and Moore (2008) for a model in which contracts serve as reference points and there may be
ine¢ cient shading ex post (cf. also Walker, 2013, for a survey of the subsequent literature).
33Note that if there are two homogenous assets, then shared ownership with r0 = 0:5 is
equivalent to giving each party one asset. Figueroa and Skreta (2011) also stress the importance
of whether or not assets are homogenous in a partnership dissolution model with multiple assets.
Following Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), their contribution is focused on ine¢ ciencies due
to asymmetric information, while they do not consider investment incentives.
34So far, surprisingly few experiments have been conducted on the allocation of ownership
rights in incomplete contracting frameworks with an ex post bargaining stage, see Sonnemans
et al. (2001), Erlei and Siemer (2014), and Kusterer and Schmitz (2017).
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Appendix
The analysis in Section 3 immediately implies that in general the total surplus
S(r0) := S(a(r0); b(r0)) can be written as35
S(r0) =
8<: 12( 1cA + 1cB )v2A   18cA (1  r0)2(vA + vBA)2   18cB [(1 + Br0) vA   (1  r0) vB]2 if vA  vB;1
2
( 1
cA
+ 1
cB
)v2B   18cA [(1 + (1  r0)A) vB   r0vA]2   18cB r20(vB + BvA)2 if vA < vB:
Suppose rst that following the traditional property rights approach to the
theory of the rm only sole ownership is taken into account, r0 2 f0; 1g. It is
straightforward to show that S(1) > S(0), i.e. A-ownership is strictly better than
B-ownership, whenever
cA
cB
<
(vA + AvB)
2
(2 + B)Bv2A + (2vA   vB)vB
if vA  vB;
cA
cB
<
(2 + A)Av
2
B + (2vB   vA)vA
(vB + BvA)2
if vA < vB:
Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the main text illustrate these general conditions for
specic parameter constellations.
Observe that if A = B =: , then an increase in  increases the range of
parameters for which ownership by the party with the smaller valuation out-
performs ownership by the party with the larger valuation. To see this, note
that
d
d
(vA + vB)
2
(2 + )v2A + (2vA   vB)vB
=  2 vA   vB
[
 
2+ 2

v2A + 2vAvB   v2B]2
[(v3A   v3B)+ (v2A   v2B)vA
+
 
1 + + 2

v2AvB + vAv
2
B]
< 0
if vA > vB; while
d
d
(2 + )v2B + (2vB   vA)vA
(vB + vA)2
= 2
vB   vA
(vB + vA)
3
 
v2B   v2A + v2B + vAvB

> 0
35Observe that S(r0) is weakly decreasing in A and in B . Hence, if at the outset the
parties could endogenously choose which fraction of the investments should be embodied in
the physical capital, they would prefer all investments to be in human capital.
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if vA < vB.
Now suppose that shared ownership is feasible, so r0 2 [0; 1]. Maximizing
S(r0), we nd that the optimal initial ownership share of party A is given by
r0 =
8<: maxf
(vA+AvB)
2cB (vA vB)(vB+BvA)cA
(vB+BvA)2cA+(vA+AvB)2cB
; 0g if vA  vB;
minf (1+A)(vA+AvB)vBcB
(vB+BvA)2cA+(vA+AvB)2cB
; 1g if vA < vB:
Figures 5 and 6 in the main text illustrate the optimal ownership share r0 for
specic parameter constellations.
Observe that when shared ownership is feasible, then the party with the larger
valuation should not be the sole owner initially, since r0 < 1 if vA > vB, while
r0 > 0 if vA < vB. Furthermore, sole ownership by party B is optimal if vA > vB
and
cA
cB
>
(vA + AvB)
2
(vA   vB)(vB + BvA) ,
while sole ownership by party A is optimal if vA < vB and
cA
cB
<
Av
2
B + (1  A)vAvB   v2A
v2B + 2BvAvB + 
2
Bv
2
A
;
which proves Proposition 5.
Note that (vA+AvB)
2
(vA vB)(vB+BvA) > 1 when vA > vB, since
(vA + AvB)
2   (vA   vB)(vB + BvA)
= (1  B)(vA   vB)vA + 2AvAvB +
 
1 + 2A

v2B > 0:
Moreover, Av
2
B+(1 A)vAvB v2A
v2B+2BvAvB+
2
Bv
2
A
< 1 when vA < vB, since
v2B + 2BvAvB + 
2
Bv
2
A   (Av2B + (1  A)vAvB   v2A)
= (1  A)(vB   vA)vB + 2BvAvB + (1 + 2B)v2A > 0:
Hence, when shared ownership is feasible, then sole ownership by a party can
be optimal only if the cost advantage of this party is su¢ ciently strong and the
other party has a larger valuation.
26
References
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., Legros, P., Zingales, L., 2016. The Impact of
Incomplete Contracts on Economics. Oxford University Press.
Aghion, P., Tirole, J., 1994. The management of innovation. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 109, 11851209.
Akintoye, A., 2009. PPPs for physical infrastructure in developing countries.
In: Akintoye, A., Beck, M. (eds), Policy, Finance and Management for
Public-Private Partnerships, Blackwell Publishing, 123144.
Besley, T., Ghatak, M., 2001. Government versus private ownership of public
goods. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 13431372.
Bhattacharyya, S., Lafontaine, F., 1995. Double-sided moral hazard and the
nature of share contracts. Rand Journal of Economics 26, 761781.
Bleeke, J., Ernst, D., 1995. Is your strategic alliance really a sale? Harvard
Business Review 73, 97105.
Bunting, W.C., 2016. Resolving conicts over scarce resources: Private versus
shared ownership. Marquette Law Review 99, 893929.
Buso, M., Marty, F., Tran, P.T., 2017. Public-private partnerships from budget
constraints: Looking for debt hiding? International Journal of Industrial
Organization 51, 5684.
Chan, S.H., Kensinger, J.W., Keown, A.J., Martin, J.D., 1997. Do strategic
alliances create value? Journal of Financial Economics 46, 199221.
Cramton, P., Gibbons, R., Klemperer, P., 1987. Dissolving a partnership e¢ -
ciently. Econometrica 55, 615632.
dAspremont, C., Gérard-Varet, L.A., 1979. Incentives and incomplete infor-
mation. Journal of Public Economics 11, 2545.
Deng, Z., Song, S., Chen, Y., 2016. Private participation in infrastructure
project and its impact on the project cost. China Economic Review 39,
6376.
Desai, M.A., Foley, C.F., Hines, J.R., 2004. The costs of shared ownership:
evidence from international joint ventures. Journal of Financial Economics
73, 323374.
27
Desrieux, C., 2009. Owner or holder? A critical study of property rights in
public services. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 165,
230249.
Erlei, M., Siemer, J.P., 2014. Endogenous property rights in a hold-up experi-
ment. Metroeconomica 65, 237270.
Figueroa, N., Skreta, V., 2011. What to put on the table. Working Paper.
Fosfuri, A., Helmers, C., Roux, C., 2017. Shared ownership of intangible prop-
erty rights: The case of patent co-assignments. Working Paper.
Gattai, V., Natale, P., 2016. Investment spillovers and the allocation of property
rights. Economics Letters 145, 109113.
Gattai, V., Natale, P., 2017. A new Cinderella story: Joint ventures and the
property rights theory of the rm. Journal of Economic Surveys 31, 281
302.
Goldlücke, S., Schmitz, P.W., 2014. Investments as signals of outside options.
Journal of Economic Theory 150, 683708.
Goltsman, M., 2011. Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem.
Rand Journal of Economics 42, 495526.
Greco, L., 2015. Imperfect bundling in public-private partnerships. Journal of
Public Economic Theory 17, 136146.
Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D., 1986. The costs and benets of ownership: A
theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy 94,
691719.
Hart, O.D., 1995. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford University
Press.
Hart, O.D., Moore, J., 1990. Property rights and the nature of the rm. Journal
of Political Economy 98, 11191158.
Hart, O., Moore, J., 2008. Contracts as reference points. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 123, 148.
Hart, O., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. The proper scope of government:
theory and application to prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112,
11271161.
Holmström, B., 1999. The rm as a subeconomy. Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization 15, 74102.
28
Holmström, B., Milgrom, P., 1994. The rm as an incentive system. American
Economic Review 84, 972991.
Hoppe, E.I., Schmitz, P.W., 2013. Public-private partnerships versus traditional
procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering. RAND
Journal of Economics 44, 5674.
Huberman, G., Kahn, C., 1988. Limited contract enforcement and strategic
renegotiation. American Economic Review 78, 471484.
Kusterer, D.J., Schmitz, P.W., 2017. The management of innovation: experi-
mental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 104, 706725.
La¤ont, J.-J., Martimort, D., 2002. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-
Agent Model. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Lau, S., 2008. Information and bargaining in the hold-up problem. Rand
Journal of Economics 39, 266282.
Li, S., Sun, H., Yan, J., Yu, J., 2015. Bundling decisions in procurement
auctions with sequential tasks. Journal of Public Economics 128, 96106.
Maskin, E., Moore, J., 1999. Implementation and renegotiation. Review of
Economic Studies 66, 3956.
Mori, Y., 2017. A formal model of rm boundaries and haggling. Economics
Letters 156, 1517.
Muthoo, A., 1999. Bargaining Theory With Applications. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Myerson, R.B., Satterthwaite, M.A., 1983. E¢ cient mechanisms for bilateral
trading. Journal of Economic Theory 29, 265281.
Oxley, J.E., Sampson, R.C., 2004. The scope and governance of international
R&D alliances. Strategic Management Journal 25, 723749.
Pisano, G.P., 1989. Using equity participation to support exchange: Evidence
from the biotechnology industry. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organi-
zation 5, 109126.
Rogerson, W.P., 1992. Contractual solutions to the hold-up problem. Review
of Economic Studies 59, 777793.
Rosenkranz, S., Schmitz, P.W., 2003. Optimal allocation of ownership rights in
dynamic R&D alliances. Games and Economic Behavior 43, 153173.
29
Santamaría, L., Nieto, M.J., Barge-Gil, A., 2009. Beyond formal R&D: taking
advantage of other sources of innovation in low- and medium-technology
industries. Research Policy 38, 507517.
Sarmento, J.M., Renneboog, L., 2016. Anatomy of public-private partnerships:
their creation, nancing and renegotiations. International Journal of Man-
aging Projects in Business 9, 94-122.
Saussier, S., Staropoli, C., Yvrande-Billon, A., 2009. Public-private agreements,
institutions, and competition: When economic theory meets facts. Review
of Industrial Organization 35, 118.
Schmitz, P.W., 2002. Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric infor-
mation, and the hold-up problem. European Economic Review 46, 169
188.
Schmitz, P.W., 2006. Information gathering, transaction costs, and the property
rights approach. American Economic Review 96, 422434.
Schmitz, P.W., 2015. Government versus private ownership of public goods:
The role of bargaining frictions. Journal of Public Economics 132, 2331.
Segal, I., Whinston, M.D., 2013. Property rights. Handbook of Organizational
Economics, 100158.
Sonnemans, J., Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., 2001. On the relation between asset
ownership and specic investments. Economic Journal 111, 791820.
Stein, J.C., 1997. Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate
resources. Journal of Finance 52, 111133.
Su, A. P.-J., 2017. Information revelation in the property right theory of the
rms. International Journal of Industrial Organization 52, 133164.
Tamada, Y., Tsai, T.-S., 2007. Optimal organization in a sequential investment
problem with the principals cancellation option. International Journal of
Industrial Organization 25, 631641.
Tamada, Y., Tsai, T.-S., 2014. Delegating the decision-making authority to
terminate a sequential project. Journal of Economic Behavior and Orga-
nization 99, 178194.
Tirole, J., 1999. Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand? Econometrica 67,
741781.
Tirole, J., 2015. Cognition-intensive contracting. Discussion Paper, Toulouse
School of Economics.
30
Tsai, T.-S., Kung, S.-C., 2011. Sequential investments, know-how transmission,
and optimal organization. BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 11, 124.
Walker, P., 2013. The reference pointapproach to the theory of the rm: An
introduction. Journal of Economic Surveys 27, 670695.
Zhao, H., Zhu, G., 1998. Determinants of ownership preference of international
joint ventures: new evidence from Chinese manufacturing industries. In-
ternational Business Review 7, 569589.
Zingales, L. 2016. Why the incomplete contract approach is important for
nance. In: Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., Legros, P., Zingales, L. (eds.),
The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics. Oxford University
Press.
31
